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Voluntary Corporate Environmental Initiatives  
and Shareholder Wealth 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Researchers debate whether environmental investments reduce firm value or actually improve financial 
performance. We provide some compelling evidence on shareholder wealth effects of membership in 
voluntary environmental programs (VEPs). Companies announcing membership in EPA’s Climate 
Leaders, a program targeting reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, experience significantly negative 
abnormal stock returns. The price decline is larger in firms with poor corporate governance structures, 
and for high market-to-book (i.e., high growth) firms. However, firms joining Ceres, a program involving 
more general environmental commitments, have insignificant announcement returns, as do portfolios of 
industry rivals. Overall, corporate commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions appear to conflict 
with firm value-maximization. This has important implications for policies that rely on voluntary 
initiatives to address climate change. Further, we find that firms tend to join Climate Leaders either in 
response to climate-related shareholder resolutions or due to weak corporate governance standards which 
give managers the discretion to make such voluntary environmentally responsible investment decisions—
decisions that may result in lower firm value.  
 
JEL classification: Q5, G31, G38 
 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Environmentally responsible investing; Climate 
change; Greenhouse gas emissions; Capital expenditures; Shareholder wealth. 
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1. Introduction 
 A rapidly growing corporate trend in recent years, that has many taking notice, is the 
number of companies engaged in voluntary environmentally responsible (VER) activities. These 
activities span a wide range, including membership in public voluntary programs that encourage 
pollution reductions, unilateral efforts by companies to improve their environmental 
performance, and the voluntary public disclosure of environmental performance measures 
(Khanna, 2001). With this trend, a growing number of people are asking whether better 
environmental performance translates into higher financial performance. Corporate investments 
in environmental technologies have traditionally been considered a drain on a firm’s resources, 
creating an inherent conflict between environmental and financial performance (e.g. Palmer et al, 
1995; Walley and Whitehead, 1994). However, others have argued that corporate environmental 
responsibility can actually improve financial performance. Potential gains from improved 
environmental performance can result from a differentiation of product (increasing customer 
demand and hence sales and/or margins) by signaling that the company is “green”, a reduction in 
the risk of future environmental liabilities and lawsuits, and a cut in production costs as a result 
of pollution-reducing measures (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Reinhardt, 1999). Moreover, 
improving environmental performance could spur governmental regulatory actions, giving the 
first-mover firms a competitive advantage once their industry rivals are forced to comply 
(Reinhardt, 1999). 
 The empirical evidence on the relationship between environmental performance and 
financial performance has been mixed. Several approaches have been used to study this 
relationship: (1) regression analysis; (2) portfolio analysis; and (3) event studies. Regression 
studies have focused on the relationship between environmental performance and accounting 
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profitability measures, with several of these studies documenting a positive relationship.1
Portfolio analysis studies have reported similar results. White (1996) and Geczy et al 
(2005) find that socially or environmentally responsible mutual funds earn lower risk-adjusted 
returns. Ziegler et al (2009) find that an investment strategy that buys stocks of firms that are 
making efforts to lower their greenhouse gas emissions and sells stocks of firms with little or no 
 
However, other regression studies—e.g., Jaggi and Freedman (1992), Molloy, Erekson, and 
Gorman (2002), and Clarkson and Li (2004)—report a mixed or negative relationship between 
environmental performance measures and accounting profitability. Although a clear explanation 
for these contrasting results is not obvious, in general it seems that studies where the 
environmental performance measure is tied to liability, compliance, and regulatory risks find a 
positive relationship between environmental performance and financial performance. This is 
consistent with the findings of Khanna and Damon (1999), Anton et al (2004), Darnall et al 
(2008) and Brouhle et al (2009) which show that liability and regulatory threats are a major 
motivation for firms joining voluntary programs like EPA’s 33/50 Program to reduce toxic 
emissions and adopting environmental management systems (EMS). Additionally, Malloy, 
Erekson and Gorman (2002), in their study of investor perceptions, find that environmental 
investments are interpreted by investors to raise costs (rather than lower them), except in the case 
where the firm would face non-compliance penalties if these investments were not made. This 
would imply that firms should experience a negative impact on financial performance from 
environmental investments unless these investments are made in response to liability, 
compliance, or regulatory threats—a finding consistent with the empirical evidence.  
                                                 
1 Cormier, Magnan and Morard (1993), Hart and Ahuja (1996), Russo and Fouts (1997), King and Lenox (2001), 
Konar and Cohen (2001), Guenster et al (2006), and Ziegler et al (2007).  Although Telle (2006) finds a positive 
effect with a pooled regression controlling for industry and size, the author finds that this effect goes away when 
firm fixed effects are included. 
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climate change mitigation effort results in a negative abnormal return. However, Cohen, Fenn, 
and Konar (1997) and Derwall et al (2005) both find that portfolios containing stocks of 
companies with high environmental performance scores have positive returns and, in the case of 
Derwall et al (2005), even outperform portfolios containing low environmental performing 
company stocks. To understand these contrasting results, it is important to examine the 
environmental performance measure being used in each of these studies. In Cohen, Fenn, and 
Konar (1997), the environmental performance score is based on Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
data and is a function of the probability of noncompliance detection, expected size of sanctions, 
and expected reputational loss—all factors that would result in lower firm value. In Derwall et al 
(2005), the environmental performance ranking is based on Innovest rankings and is a function 
of historical liabilities, operating risk, eco-efficiency risk, managerial risk, and environmentally-
related strategic business opportunities, many of which would result in lower firm value. These 
findings are also consistent with the prediction that firms engaged in environmental activities to 
lower risk will experience positive returns whereas firms engaged in these activities for other 
reasons will not. 
The results from event studies are also consistent with this prediction. Hamilton (1995), 
an event study based on TRI data releases, finds that after these data are made publicly available, 
firms highlighted in the press—due to their high toxic release numbers—earn significant 
negative abnormal returns. Thus, investors are interpreting this new information as an increase in 
the firm’s liability or compliance risk that is likely to result in increased costs. Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996) find that environmental performance award announcements result in positive 
abnormal returns while environmental crisis announcements result in negative abnormal returns, 
also consistent with the prediction that investors will reward information that suggests a future 
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increase in firm value and punish information that suggests a decline in firm value. Cañon-de-
Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009), in their event study of ISO 14001 certification 
announcements, find that less polluting and less internationalized firms experience a drop in 
stock price after their ISO 14001 announcement. The authors interpret this as investors 
perceiving the resources required to comply with ISO 14001 certification to be costly to the firm 
with little or no offsetting benefit. 
The pervasive use of environmental liability and toxic release data in many of these 
previous studies reporting a positive relationship between environmental and financial 
performance, however, limit our ability to generalize these result to investments unrelated to 
liability, compliance, and regulatory risks. Voluntary environmental programs related to climate 
change, for instance, originate from a starkly different regulatory context: most greenhouse gases 
(GHG) are currently not regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) although 
a number of regional climate initiatives (e.g., the Western Climate Initiative, the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord) have recently 
been established, many of which only target the electric power sector and large industrial 
sources. As a result, liability, compliance, and regulatory risks related to climate are not so clear. 
How do investors interpret climate-related environmental investments? As a cost to the firm with 
no offsetting benefit similar to the findings of Cañon-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009)? Or, 
will investors perceive these investments as adding firm value or avoiding future costs to the 
firm similar to Russo and Fouts (1997) and King and Lenox (2001)? As emphasized in King and 
Lenox (2001), the appropriate question may not be, “does it pay to be green?” but rather “when 
does it pay to be green?” 
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In this study we estimate the cumulative abnormal stock returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅�) for a sample of 
firms announcing their participation in one of two voluntary environmental programs (VEPs): 
the EPA’s Climate Leaders (CL) program and Ceres. We find that firms announcing membership 
in Climate Leaders experience a significant drop in stock price (on average -1.0%). Moreover, 
when firms as part of the CL program subsequently announce a specific goal for the reduction of 
their GHG gas emissions, their stock price declines further (-1.1% on average). Thus, it seems 
that investors are interpreting membership in Climate Leaders and subsequent pledges to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions as imposing significant costs on the firm, leading to a decline in 
shareholder wealth. The firms joining Ceres, however, have insignificant announcement 𝐶𝐴𝑅�s, 
likely due to the program’s broad scope and general principles (rather than specific standards) in 
all environmental areas (not just climate change), making it difficult for investors to assess what 
membership implies for the firm’s cost structure. The announcement returns are more negative 
for firms with governance structures that imply fewer shareholder rights. That is, the marginal 
effect on firm value is more dramatic when shareholders have less influence on the firm’s 
activities. Moreover, the stock price drop is greater for firms with high market-to-book ratios, 
suggesting that climate investments are interpreted by investors to be more costly for high 
growth firms.  
We also analyze the valuation effect on the industry competitors of the sample firms. 
Industry rivals of firms joining Climate Leaders or Ceres could be negatively affected by these 
firms announcing their membership in these programs for a number of reasons. First, the sample 
firms could gain competitive advantage as first-movers in complying with expected future 
regulation. Second, as discussed in Reinhardt (1999), these firm may be attempting to “manage 
their competitors” by engaging in environmentally responsible activities that would encourage 
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regulation that could benefit these firms in particular. Thus, if the announcement spurs federal 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions that will ultimate change the cost structure of the 
industry we expect a negative rival stock price reaction. Alternatively, rival firms could benefit 
positively from the sample firms’ decision to join CL or Ceres. For example, investors could 
decide to dump shares of the CL firms and invest in non-CL firms, which would result in a 
positive return for rival firms if these purchases are anticipated (or executed) at the time of 
announcement and span across a sufficient number of rivals. We find, however, insignificant 
announcement returns for portfolios of industry rival stocks. This is consistent with the notion 
that the average membership in Climate Leaders or Ceres does not materially affect the cost 
structure of the industry. It is possible that the sample firms’ environmental capital expenditures 
are limited by industry competitive pressures, thus reducing the competitive advantage of the 
firm should regulation eventually force rivals to make comparable investments.  
Our event study results suggest that investors are interpreting participation in Climate 
Leaders as imposing a significant cost on the firm. If this is the case, and given that the board of 
directors has a fiduciary duty to shareholders, why are firms joining Climate Leaders? A number 
of studies have attempted to identify key motivating factors for a company’s involvement in 
voluntary environmental activities.2
                                                 
2 See Khanna (2001) for a nice survey. 
 Khanna and Damon (1999), Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 
(2004), and Brouhle, Griffiths, and Wolverton (2009) each find liability and regulatory threats to 
be key motivating factors for voluntary environmental activities, suggesting that these voluntary 
programs are not likely to be effective without the threat of mandatory regulation. Anton, Deltas, 
and Khanna (2004) also find that pressure from consumers and investors is motivating firms to 
adopt environmental management systems (EMS).  
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To assess the importance of institutional pressure, Reid and Toffel (2009) test whether 
pressure from shareholder activists and a firm’s location increase the probability that the firm 
voluntarily discloses its emissions of carbon as part of the Carbon Disclosure Project, a non-
profit organization that maintains a database of self-reported company carbon emissions. They 
find that shareholder resolutions on climate change increase the probability of disclosure, and 
firms located in states with regional climate initiatives are more likely to disclose emissions. 
Their study, however, does not assess whether this disclosure has an impact on the firm’s stock 
price. Darnall, Henriques, and Sadorsky (2008) and Cañon-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe 
(2009), however, find that firms adopting environmental management systems in response to 
these types of institutional pressures do not experience positive financial returns for their efforts, 
as they may be purely symbolic and therefore not implemented efficiently. Cañon-de-Francia 
and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009) distinguish between reactive and proactive environmental efforts, and 
find that reactive efforts—i.e., efforts undertaken in reaction to institutional pressures—are more 
likely to result in negative returns whereas proactive efforts are more likely to result in positive 
returns. 
To understand why firms join the Climate Leaders program, we extend our analysis to 
include a cross-sectional probit analysis that attempts to identify factors that could explain why 
firms join, limiting our analysis to the industries represented by the sample firms. We find that 
the likelihood that a firm will join the Climate Leaders program increases the more hostile the 
firm’s corporate governance structure is to shareholders and the better the firm’s past 
environmental record. Importantly, controlling for corporate governance structure, we find that 
firms with a greater number of climate-related shareholder resolutions are much more likely to 
join Climate Leaders, similar to the findings of Reid and Toffel (2009). The negative 
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announcement returns coupled with the significantly positive effect of climate-related 
shareholder resolutions on the probability of joining Climate Leaders suggest that firms are not 
joining because membership adds value to the firm; rather, these firms are joining CL because of 
pressures from shareholder activists. As described in Darnall, Henriques, and Sadorsky (2008) 
and Cañon-de-Francia and Garcés-Ayerbe (2009), environmental decisions made based on 
institutional pressures are not likely to lead to higher financial returns.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the CL and 
Ceres programs, the sampling procedure and characteristics of the sample firms. Section 3 
describes our event study and reports the results from cross-sectional regressions of the 
announcements returns. The rival firm abnormal returns are analyzed in Section 4, while Section 
5 examines the decision to join Climate Leaders. Lastly, Section 6 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Sample Selection and Data Description 
This study focuses on two voluntary corporate environmental initiatives: EPA’s Climate Leaders 
program and Ceres. We have chosen these programs because of their emphasis on voluntary 
commitments by firms to improve their environmental performance, and the promotional 
opportunities offered as one of the main benefits to their members.  
2.1 The Climate Leaders program and the Ceres Principles 
The EPA’s Climate Leaders program is an industry-government partnership that works with 
companies to develop long-term strategies to reduce their impact on the climate. The CL 
corporate partners set aggressive 5-10 year goals for the reduction of greenhouse gases, and 
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annually track and report their emissions to measure progress.3 In return, EPA provides technical 
assistance for the measurement and reporting of the firms’ GHG emissions. The CL program, 
which started in 2002, requires its partners to conduct a careful inventory (quantity estimate) of 
their current GHG emissions before they commit to a specific reduction goal. The announcement 
of this goal usually follows within a year of the membership announcement. The goal is typically 
stated in percent reduction of total emissions, percent reduction of emissions per unit of output 
(KWh, dollar of revenue, production unit, tons produced, etc.), or a “net zero” goal. The latter 
implies that instead of decreasing its own pollution, the company pays for the reduction of 
another company’s pollution or offsets its own pollution by planting trees or sponsoring clean 
energy projects, so called “offset projects”.4
Ceres is a national network of environmental organizations and other public interest 
groups that works with companies and investors to address sustainability challenges, including 
global climate change. The Ceres Principles is a ten-point code of corporate environmental 
conduct, dated 1989, that is publicly endorsed by companies as an environmental mission 
statement.
  
5
                                                 
3 The Climate Leaders program focuses on the six major greenhouse gases: CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6. 
 Firms adopting the Ceres Principles pledge their dedication to environmental 
awareness and accountability, and commit to active continuous improvement, dialogue and 
systematic public reporting on their environmental progress. The Ceres Principles include 
reduction of pollution and waste, sustainable use of natural resources, energy conservation, and 
environmental restoration, as well as a commitment to inform the public and conduct a yearly 
self-evaluation of the progress in implementing the principles. Ceres provides advice on 
reporting and incident response, and helps communicate the company’s environmental 
4 Companies like the Carbon Fund and TerraPass specialize in arranging offset projects for greenhouse gases. 
5 It is possible for firms to agree to a subset of the 10 Ceres principles; however, in our data set of Ceres announce-
ments, every firm agreed to the full set of Ceres principles. 
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commitment to investors and the broader public. To enhance corporate accountability, the Ceres 
companies annually publish information on their environmental progress in corporate 
sustainability reports.6
In the context of voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) discussed in Khanna (2001), 
EPA’s Climate Leaders program fall under the category of “public voluntary programs” which 
are facilitated by a government agency to encourage firms to reduce pollution. Ceres, on the 
other hand, fall under the category of “unilateral initiatives” that involve codes of conduct 
established by a non-governmental entity and therefore does not have direct government 
involvement. These programs therefore differ in terms of who is managing the program and the 
specific requirements of the program (e.g., specific targets versus overall conduct guidelines). 
Including both programs in our analysis will allow us to study the effects of these program 
differences. 
  
2.2 Sample selection 
The sample used in our analysis consists of 117 announcements over the period 1993-2008. We 
began with all 181 firms that joined the CL program7
                                                 
6 For more information on CL and Ceres, see http://www.epa.gov/stateply/index.html and http://www.ceres.org. 
 and all 72 firms that joined the Ceres 
program over this time period, for a total of 253 firms. We then eliminate 59 firms that were 
listed outside the U.S. or privately held, leaving 195 firms. Searching Factiva and Lexis-Nexis 
Environmental for articles and press releases announcing that the company joins CL or Ceres, we 
are able to identify an exact announcement date for 148 of these 195 firms. Moreover, we find 
the subsequent announcement of a GHG reduction goal for 47 of the CL firms, for a total of 195 
announcements. We next search Factiva, Lexis-Nexis Academic and Google Finance on the day 
7 Eleven of these firms have since left the CL program.  We have no information on the precise date of when these 
firms left the program or the reason behind these firms’ decision to drop out of the program. 
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of the announcement and the surrounding days (i.e., the event window) for articles and press 
releases with competing news that could potentially impact the stock price. This search 
eliminates 78 announcement observations due to the concomitant release of information on 
earnings, credit downgrades and other major corporate news on the day of the announcement 
through the next trading day, for a total sample of 117 announcements over the period 1993-
2008. 
Table 1 reports the distribution of the announcements over time and across the different 
programs. As shown in the table, the sample consists of 74 announcements by firms joining the 
Climate Leaders program and 20 announcements by firms joining the Ceres program. Moreover, 
there are 23 announcements by firms declaring their goal for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, of which 16 are also in our Climate Leaders sample.8
2.3 Sample characteristics 
 Most of the Ceres 
announcements take place in the 1990s, and 2006-07, while the number of CL and GHG 
announcements is relatively higher after 2006. 
Table 2 presents financial and industry characteristics of the sample firms. We identify a total of 
3,684 industry rivals (2,957 unique firm years) from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), defined as all firms with the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
industry code as the sample firm in the year of the announcement. Notice first that the sample 
firms are large when compared to other publicly traded firms in their industry. The average 
market value of equity six trading days prior to the announcement is $78 billion (median $19 
billion) and total sales (from Compustat) averages $19 billion (median $10 billion) in the year 
                                                 
8 This implies that 23-16=7 GHG reduction goal announcements are associated with CL firms whose CL member-
ship announcement was eliminated from our original set of observations because of the lack of an exact announce-
ment date or the existence of concomitant news occurring at or around the time of the CL membership announce-
ment. 
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prior to the announcement. Moreover, 91% (94%) of the sample firms have a market value (total 
sales) exceeding the median rival firm in its respective industry. The average market-to-book 
ratio (from Compustat, using the December closing price in the year prior to the announcement) 
is 3.7 (median 2.6). The sample firms have somewhat higher growth options than their industry 
rivals, with two-thirds of the firms having a market-to-book ratio above their respective industry 
median. Only 15% of the sample firms are traded on NASDAQ (versus the NYSE or Amex), 
another manifestation of the large size of firms joining Ceres and Climate Leaders.  
Companies joining Climate Leaders and setting greenhouse gas goals are substantially 
larger than the firms in Ceres: the average market value of the CL firms is $93 billion (median 
$28 billion) compared to $13 billion (median $3 billion) for the Ceres firms. Moreover, almost 
all companies in Climate Leaders (96%) have a market value exceeding their respective median 
industry rival, while two-thirds of the Ceres firms are larger than their respective industry 
median. The Ceres firms further have a slightly higher average book-to-market ratio than the 
firms in the CL group. The proportion of firms listed on NASDAQ, however, is similar across 
the three subsamples. 
Table 2 also shows the number of rivals and the degree of industry concentration, 
indicating the level of competition in the industry. For our rival analysis, we construct portfolios 
of rival firms in the same four-digit SIC industry code as the announcing firm. There are on 
average 35 rival firms in each industry portfolio, with a median of 16 firms. Industry 
concentration is measured using the Herfindahl index, 𝐻𝐼 = ∑ �𝑠𝑗/∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 �
2𝑛
𝑗=1 , where 𝑠𝑗 is the 
total sales of firm 𝑗, and 𝑗 = [1,𝑛] is an index of all firms in the industry. The average 
Herfindahl index is 0.34, with a median of 0.26. Firms stating GHG goals are in the least 
concentrated (or most competitive) industries, with an average Herfindahl index of 0.25 (median 
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0.11). Finally, a majority of the sample firms (57%) are in the manufacturing industry, 16% in 
the transportation industry, and 9% in the finance industry, with the remaining 18% distributed 
across other industries. The proportion of firms in manufacturing is highest for the CL and GHG 
groups (59% and 61%, respectively) and lowest for Ceres (45%), with a greater fraction of Ceres 
firms in transportation and finance. 
2.4 Environmental performance 
The degree to which firms rely on energy as an input to the production process varies across 
industries. We classify industries based on their overall use of fossil fuels, applying criteria from 
the Carbon Disclosure Project.9 One-half of the sample firms (53%) are in industries with 
carbon-intensive production. Not surprisingly, the fraction of firms in carbon-intensive industries 
is lower for Ceres than for firms announcing a GHG reduction goal (45% versus 61%), reflecting 
the lower proportion of manufacturing firms joining Ceres.10
We are able to find information on the initial goal for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions from the firms’ sustainability reports for 19 firms joining Climate Leaders and for all 
23 firms in the GHG sample.
 The majority of sample firms (70 
firms or 60%) are incorporated in a state participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), while only three sample firms (3%) are headquartered in a Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI) state, two of which joined the Ceres program. 
11 The average goal is a 16% reduction of greenhouse gases 
(median 15%), with the smallest goal set at a 4% emission reduction.12
                                                 
9 See http://www.cdproject.net/index.asp for more information on the Carbon Disclosure Project. 
 The most aggressive goal 
10 Greenhouse gas emissions of individual firms are only available for a small sample of firms and for a few years.  
We therefore choose to rely on the industry classification to capture a firm’s carbon-intensity in the cross-sectional 
analysis. 
11 For obvious reasons, Ceres firms do not report any goal for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
12 Greenhouse gas goals can come in various forms—e.g., % reductions from a base year or level reductions.  In 
order to be comparable, we have converted each firm’s GHG goal to a % reduction goal using data on the firm’s 
actual GHG emissions. 
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is set by United Technologies Corporation, who initially pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 46% per dollar revenue over a five-year period. None of the sample firms have net-
zero goals involving the purchase of offset projects. The average company hopes to reach its 
emissions reduction goal in almost seven years. There is little difference between the firms in the 
CL and GHG samples with respect to the size of the announced greenhouse gas reduction goals 
and the time horizon reported to reach these goals. 
KLD Research and Analytics, Inc. provides yearly assessments of company 
environmental performance in their product, KLD STATS. We use KLD STATS to gauge the 
environmental performance of the sample firms in the year prior to the announcement. KLD 
rates companies with a one (if present) or zero (if absent) in five areas of environmental strengths 
and seven areas of environmental concerns.13
As shown in Table 3, the average firm ranks lower on its environmental strengths than its 
concerns (0.47 versus 0.79), reflecting the lower number of strengths than concerns (five versus 
seven). The companies in Ceres have a better overall pre-announcement environmental standing 
than firms in Climate Leaders, with a mean score of 0.43 for environmental concerns and 0.57 
 The environmental strengths include revenue from 
environmental services, programs for pollution prevention, and the use of recycled materials and 
clean energy, while environmental concerns include liabilities for hazardous waste sites, 
violations of environmental regulations, manufacturing of ozone depleting and agricultural 
chemicals, emissions of toxic chemicals, and revenue derived from the sale of fossil fuels. As 
shown in Table 3, we focus on two environmental performance measures: the number of 
environmental strengths and the number of environmental concerns. We are able to identify KLD 
records for 99 sample firms and 1,246 unique industry-year rivals. 
                                                 
13 There are a total of seven environmental strengths in KLD STATS. We exclude, however, two of the environmen-
tal strengths that are reported for only part of the sample period. 
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for environmental strengths versus 0.81 for environmental concerns and 0.39 for environmental 
strengths in the case of the CL firms. Moreover, 87% of the Ceres firms have an environmental 
concerns score equal to or higher than their respective average industry rival.  
Interestingly, the sample firms for GHG goals and Ceres rate significantly higher than 
their respective average competitor on environmental strengths. The highest average number of 
strengths (0.67) is associated with firms declaring a greenhouse gas reduction goal. There is no 
discernible difference between the sample firms and their rivals in the environmental concerns 
score. The Ceres firms, however, have on average fewer concerns than firms in the Climate 
Leaders program. Overall, the sample firms for GHG goals and Ceres have an environmental 
performance equal to or better than their average industry competitor in the year prior to the 
event. 
Table 3 also shows how sample firms rank on two corporate governance characteristics, 
both from Risk Metrics. The first is the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (GIM) index (from the 
Governance database), measuring the number of provision that restricts shareholders rights. The 
maximum number of such provisions is 18 and the higher the index the weaker are shareholder 
rights.14
3. Shareholder Wealth Effects 
 We are able to obtain the GIM index for 96 of the sample firms. The average rank on 
the GIM index is 9.5 (median 9.0), ranging from a low of four to a high of 16. The second 
measure is the number of shareholder proposals related to climate change filed in the year of and 
the year prior to the event (from the Shareholder Proposal database). Across all firms in the 
sample, the average number of climate-related proposals from shareholder activists is 0.12. 
                                                 
14 For a detailed description of the GIM index, see Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
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Why do firms join environmental initiatives like Climate Leaders and Ceres? A company may 
adopt a strategy for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions without joining the Climate 
Leaders program. Similarly, high environmental standards could be applied without an official 
endorsement of the Ceres Principles. The public pledge to a reputable program could, however, 
help reduce information asymmetries with company outsiders—investors and customers—about 
the firm’s environmental performance and commitment to the environment. This might be 
valuable if customer preferences are biased in favor of environmentally responsible suppliers, 
improving the firm’s competitive position. It could also increase firm value by credibly 
conveying information about reductions in future energy and production costs, or in future 
environmental liabilities. On the other hand, if the expected costs of the necessary capital 
expenditure and enhanced accountability exceed the potential benefits, the initiative reduces firm 
value. In this case the decision to “go green” could potentially conflict with the directors’ 
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth. 
3.1 Announcement abnormal returns 
To examine the valuation effect of voluntary corporate environmental programs, we 
estimate the announcement abnormal stock returns for the firms in our sample using an event 
study approach.15
                                                 
15 For a detailed statistical description of the event study methodology, see Appendix A. 
 The event study method has been used in more than 500 publications in top 
finance journals and its statistical properties are well-documented in the literature (Kothari and 
Warner, 2008). Its basic foundation is the efficient markets paradigm, assuming that the prices of 
financial securities are immediately updated to reflect news reaching the market. The magnitude 
of the abnormal stock performance at the time of an event offers a simple measure of the 
unanticipated impact of this event on the wealth of the firm’s shareholders. An event study hence 
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provides a natural experiment for assessing how the stock market values news on environmental 
initiatives. In particular, investors immediately incorporate in the stock price the net present 
value of all future expected cash flows associated with the announced initiative (costs and 
revenues).  
In general, short-horizon event studies (similar to the one performed in this paper) are 
relatively straightforward and trouble-free. The method involves the estimation of a benchmark 
return. The abnormal return is the difference between the actual stock return and the return 
predicted by the benchmark model. This benchmark model could be based on one factor (the 
market return) or it could be more elaborate and include additional factors, such as book-to-
market (SMB), size (HML), and momentum.16
Specifically, the abnormal return for firm j on day 𝑡 is estimated as 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (𝛼�𝑗 +
?̂?𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡), where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the return of the stock of firm j on day t; 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the equal-weighted market 
return on day t; and 𝛼�𝑗  and ?̂?𝑗 are the coefficients estimated from the single-factor market model 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 over days -253 through -3. We require a minimum of 100 return 
observations in the estimation of the market model. The cumulative abnormal return for firm j 
over the event window day -1 to +1 is 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,−1,1 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡1𝑡=−1 ; and the average cumulative 
abnormal return across the N sample firms is 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅� −1,1 =
1
𝑁
∑  𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,−1,1𝑁𝑗=1 .  
 For short windows, the use of more elaborate 
pricing model typically makes little difference for the results (MacKinlay, 1997). Thus, in the 
paper, we explicitly report the results only for the standard (one-factor) market model.  
The strength of the event study method lies in the precise definition of when the new 
information reaches the financial markets. Since it can be difficult to identify the exact trading 
day that the market reacts to the information, it is common practice to use a two or three-day 
                                                 
16 See Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
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window around the event. The event window may be extended one or two days prior to the 
announcement to capture any information leakage. Similarly, the event window may also include 
one or two succeeding trading days to capture a delay from an announcement made after the 
closing of the market or a gradual update of the stock price. Extending the window, however, 
limits the possibility to attribute the change in value to the specific event. To avoid 
contamination, we restrict the sample to firms with no other announcements of substance in the 
event window. For this reason, the longer the event window, the smaller the number of 
observations. 
Table 4 shows the average cumulative abnormal returns (𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅� ) for the sample firms 
where 0 refers to the announcement date. In addition to the full sample, Table 4 also presents the 
results for a subsample that excludes announcements in fall 2008—the height of the U.S. 
financial crisis with extremely volatile stock markets. Excluding the fall 2008 announcements, 
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅�  ranges from -0.5% for the shorter [0,1] event window to -1.1% for the longer [-2,2] event 
window, and is highly significant using alternative statistical tests.17
The stock market decline is greatest for firms joining Climate Leaders and for firms 
announcing greenhouse gas goals as part of their membership in Climate Leaders. These results 
are confirmed by the relatively low proportion of positive to negative returns: 19 positive versus 
39 negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,−1,1 for Climate Leaders and 4 versus 12 for the GHG goal. Thus, there is 
convincing evidence that shareholder value declines when firms announce their membership in 
 For the 58 firms joining 
Climate Leaders, the average drop in stock-market capitalization over the [-1,1] event window is 
a hefty $3 billion (excluding fall 2008). In the following, we focus mainly on this three-day 
window. 
                                                 
17 We also compute the test statistics for a standard Patell test (Patell, 1976) and the non-parametric rank test (Cor-
rado, 1989), both yielding similar inferences as the test statistics reported in Table 4. The results of negative an-
nouncement returns also hold when using a value-weighted market index as well as a multi-factor benchmark model. 
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Climate Leaders and again when a greenhouse goal is announced. Interestingly, the effect is 
stronger and more significant in recent years (i.e., 2006-2008), as seen by comparing the Climate 
Leader results for the periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2008. 
The announcement return for firms endorsing the Ceres Principles is, however, 
indistinguishable from zero. It is possible that the lower level of commitment to environmental 
investments associated with the Ceres program compared to Climate Leaders makes investors 
less concerned with a Ceres membership. In contrast, the capital expenditure necessary to 
substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the CL program may very well exceed the 
expected future profits from such reductions. It could also be the case that joining Ceres in the 
years prior to the introduction of the Climate Leaders may be interpreted as a more significant 
commitment to environmental initiatives. We, therefore, estimate the abnormal returns for Ceres 
announcement made before 2002 (when the Climate Leaders program was established) and after 
2002. For both time periods, however, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns are 
indistinguishable from zero (not shown in the table).  
3.2 Cross-sectional determinants of the announcement returns 
The univariate analysis in Table 4 above suggests that investors are indifferent to broader, more 
diffuse, environmental initiatives like Ceres, but penalize companies for carbon-specific 
commitments required in programs such as the Climate Leaders program. However, not all firms 
experience the same stock price reaction to a decision to join Climate Leaders. To identify the 
firm characteristics most important for explaining variation in cumulative abnormal returns 
across the firms joining Climate Leaders and announcing a greenhouse gas goal, we conduct a 
cross-sectional analysis with 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,−1,1 as the dependent variable. The regression is estimated 
with a weighted least square (WLS) regression, using the standard deviation of the residual of the 
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market model as weights. This results in giving more weight to the more precise (less noisy) 
abnormal return estimates. 
The preferences of customers and managers for voluntary environmental programs may 
have changed over time. Figure 1 plots the monthly frequency of U.S. press hits for keywords 
related to climate change over the period 1993-2008. The line represents the number of articles 
containing at least one of the following phrases: “climate leader”, “climate change”, and “global 
warming.” The figure shows how the public interest in climate change skyrocketed in 2005-2006 
and remained at a high level in subsequent years. We include log of the total number of press hits 
related to climate change over the 12 months ending in the month prior to the announcement to 
capture these shifts in societal preferences for voluntary climate-related initiatives. 
A reduction in greenhouse gas emissions typically requires a reduction in the use of fossil 
fuels. The higher the relative price of fossil fuels, the more valuable an improvement in energy 
efficiency is to the firm. The price of fossil fuels, such as oil, varies considerably over the sample 
period. As shown in Figure 2, the U.S. domestic crude oil price hovered around $10 to $20 per 
barrel through the 1990s, only to take off and reach record highs in recent years, similar to the 
development of the press index displayed in Figure 1. To capture variations in energy costs, the 
explanatory variables include the residual from a regression of climate press hits on average 
crude oil price over a three-month period ending the month prior to the announcement.18
Federal regulations of greenhouse gas emissions will most likely target industries that 
depend heavily on fossil fuels. If the pre-announcement stock price already reflects a higher 
probability of regulatory actions, the announcement of the environmental commitment should 
  
                                                 
18 We use the residual in the regression to eliminate concerns that climate press hits and the crude oil price are high-
ly correlated (confirmed by examining a correlation matrix).  By using the residual, we are able to isolate the unique 
effects of variations in crude oil price.  Crude oil prices are from the Monthly Energy Review of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy/Energy Information Administration at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/petro.html. 
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have less of an impact on firm value. To control for this, the regressions include an indicator for 
carbon-intensive industries. The regressions further control for firm characteristics such as size 
(represented by the market value of equity on day -6) and the market-to-book ratio. Moreover, it 
is possible that the extent of voluntary environmental investments is limited by industry 
competitive pressures. If industry competition prevents firms from making huge environmental 
capital expenditures, investors should be more concerned with the environmentally responsible 
investments of companies in concentrated industries. To capture this, the Herfindahl index is 
entered as a proxy for the degree of industry competition. 
The regressions also include a dummy variable indicating that the firm’s headquarters are 
located in a Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) state.19
The response of investors to news of environmental initiatives may further be affected by 
corporate governance issues. If managers undertake value-reducing environmental investments 
for reasons of social responsibility, such commitments should be more common among firms 
with poor corporate governance standards. We therefore include the GIM index (discussed 
above), the KLD rankings of corporate governance strengths and weaknesses, and the fraction of 
the firm’s shares owned by the board of directors (from Risk Metric’s Directors database). The 
KLD corporate governance strengths include indicators for low levels of top management 
 In an attempt to capture the 
effect of institutional pressures on investors’ response to the firm’s decision to join Climate 
Leaders, we include the number of shareholder proposals related to climate change in the year of 
and prior to the announcement, similar to Reid and Toffel (2009). The regressions also control 
for past environmental performance by entering the two KLD measures for the firm’s 
environmental strengths and environmental concerns.  
                                                 
19 We did not include a dummy variable for firms located in the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) states since none 
of the firms included in the regression were incorporated in any of the WCI states. 
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compensation and ownership strengths, while the concerns involve a high level of board and top 
management compensation and ownership concerns.20
Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates from the WLS regressions of the announcement 
cumulative abnormal return over the [−1,1] event window ( 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,−1,1). The sample comprises of 
78 firms with available industry rival data from Compustat, necessary to compute the Herfindahl 
index. To test for robustness of the results, we conduct six regressions. Column 1 excludes the 
corporate governance and environmental indicators, and the time dummy. Column 2 includes the 
time dummy. Columns 3 and 4 add the GIM index to the column 1 and column 2 regressions, 
respectively. Lastly, columns 5 and 6 add the other corporate governance and environmental 
measures to the column 3 and 4 regressions, respectively. The sample size shrinks to 𝑁 = 65 as 
data on the GIM index is required (Columns 3-4), and to 𝑁 = 61 when KLD records and board 
share ownership is added (Columns 5-6). The regressions are significant with an adjusted R2 
ranging from 15% to 29%.
 Lastly, the regressions include a dummy 
variable if the announcement was made during the period 2006-2008 when we found the 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅� s 
to be the most negative and significant. 
21
There are several interesting results. In the first two regressions, the announcement 
returns significantly increase with the crude oil price. That is, programs diminishing the 
dependence on fossil fuels have a greater value when energy prices are high, reducing the 
expected net loss from the investment. However, this effect goes away when we add the GIM 
corporate governance index, suggesting that these two variables are correlated—i.e., the trend in 
crude oil prices is coincident with the trend in corporate governance standards. The variable for 
  
                                                 
20 Several of the KLD variables for corporate governance strengths and concerns were not defined before the mid 
2000s. Our measures are each limited to the three dimensions that are reported for the whole period 2002-2008.  
21 Since the decision to join Climate Leaders is voluntary, these coefficient estimates may be biased. While not re-
ported here, we also conduct a Heckman two-step procedure to correct for such self-selection (Heckman, 1979; 
Maddala, 1983) and find that the main inferences hold. 
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the press coverage of climate change produces a significantly positive coefficient across all the 
regressions except for when the time dummy is included in the last regression. Thus, in contrast 
to what may appear from the univariate results in Table 4, the stock price decline is greater in 
periods of low interest from the general public in climate change, all else equal. This suggests 
that when public concern about climate change is highest, firms take a lesser hit to their stock 
price from joining Climate Leaders. We’ll return to this supposition in Section 5 below when 
examining the characteristics of firms that chose to join these programs. 
Moreover, firms with higher market-to-book ratios (i.e., more growth options) experience 
a greater decline in their stock price, suggesting that voluntary environmentally responsible 
investments are interpreted by investors to be more costly for growth firms.22 An investor’s 
belief that future greenhouse gas reduction goals may be more difficult to achieve if a firm is 
expected to grow fast or that the reallocation of resources away from positive net present value 
projects is more problematic for high-growth firms are among the possible explanations for this 
result.23
Of the corporate governance variables, only the GIM index is significant. The negative 
coefficient associated with the GIM index suggests that the more hostile a firm’s governance 
structure is to shareholders, the greater the hit to the firm’s stock price from joining Climate 
 Alternatively, the environmental investments may signal that the firm has fewer positive 
net present value projects than previously anticipated by investors (see e.g. McConnell and 
Muscarella, 1985), resulting in more serious implications for the valuation of firms with a large 
fraction of their value attributable to growth options.  
                                                 
22 In contrast, stock abnormal returns are found to increase with the market-to-book ratio for corporate announce-
ments of R&D expenditures. See e.g. Szewczyk, Tsetsekos, and Zantout (1996). 
23 Distinguishing between these two explanations is difficult since it would not necessarily require knowledge of 
each firm’s underlying motivation for joining Climate Leaders but rather information on what investors believe is 
the firm’s motivation at the time of the CL announcement. Similarly, examining what occurs at the firm level after 
the announcement (e.g., changes in investment strategies; declines in operating performance; firing of personnel) is 
not likely to assist in disentangling these alternative hypotheses since the change in stock price at the time of the 
announcement is based on investors’ expectations of future firm performance, which may or may not transpire. 
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Leaders. The coefficient associated with the RGGI dummy variable is negative but only 
significant when the regression includes the GIM index and excludes the other corporate 
governance and environmental performance measures (columns 3 and 4). The negative 
coefficient suggests that firms located in an RGGI state experience a larger decline in stock 
price. This seems counter to intuition which would tell us that the stock prices of firms in RGGI 
states already reflect an expectation that mitigation costs will be incurred; however, RGGI only 
affects the power sector in these states. Thus, a decision by other firms in these states to 
voluntarily reduce GHG emissions is considered by investors to impose a greater cost on the firm 
(than on firms located in other states) perhaps because it signals to policymakers in these 
states—policymakers with an inclination to regulate greenhouse gas emissions—that broader 
climate change regulation may be politically feasible. 
Of the environmental performance variables, neither the measure of environmental 
strengths nor the measure of environmental concerns produces significant coefficients. The 
dummy for carbon intensive industry, the degree of industry concentration (the Herfindahl index) 
and the number of climate-related shareholder resolutions also have no significant effect on a 
firm’s announcement returns. 
4. Wealth Effects for Rival Firms 
Investors react negatively when the firm announces its membership in the Climate Leaders 
program and again on the announcement of its goals for GHG reduction. The valuation impact 
on its industry rivals is, however, uncertain. The announcement may simply convey information 
about a poor investment decision made by the firm, having little or even a positive effect on the 
valuation of industry competitors. Alternatively, as suggested by our above results related to the 
RGGI states and as raised in Reinhardt (1999), a voluntary commitment to CL or Ceres could 
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spur governmental regulations, increasing the likelihood of industry-wide changes in the cost 
structure, with negative valuation implications for all firms in the industry.24
To address this issue, we form equal-weighted portfolios of all industry rivals of each 
sample firm and estimate the cumulative abnormal returns 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑟 for the rival portfolios r, as 
described above. The average 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑟 over the different event-windows and subsamples are 
reported in Table 6. Except for the rivals of firms announcing GHG goals, the average 
cumulative abnormal stock returns for the rival portfolios are insignificant from zero. This holds 
for rivals of firms joining Climate Leaders as well as Ceres, and for all three event windows.
  
25
In the case of rivals of firms announcing GHG goals, however, we document a significant 
and negative 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅� . This implies that firms who commit to specific reductions, which imply a 
stronger commitment to reducing GHGs, are causing investors to also penalize rival firms in the 
same industry, perhaps suggesting that investors will adjust upwards their expectations of future 
regulations that may affect the cost-structure for all firms in the industry. 
 
The insignificant stock price reaction for rival firms suggests that the average membership in 
Climate Leaders or Ceres does not materially increase the anticipated likelihood of future 
environmental regulations, nor does it appear to provide a competitive advantage to the sample 
firms over their rivals. 
5. The Voluntary Nature of Environmental Initiatives  
A caveat with any study of voluntary corporate decisions is that the sample firms self-select the 
event. One cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the initiative in fact reveals some other 
                                                 
24 Industry rivals are affected by new information concerning the industry cost structure, customer demand, etc. See 
e.g. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) for evidence that competitors of auto and drug companies announcing product re-
calls suffer significant stock price declines (as do the firms themselves). 
25 The rival portfolio 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅�s are insignificant from zero also when using a value-weighted market portfolio or a 
multi-factor benchmark model. 
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information about the firm. Choosing to join Climate Leaders could thus be correlated with 
negative information, without necessarily implying that the environmental investment itself is 
value reducing. As discussed in the introduction, some firms might be joining these programs to 
offset concurrent news that is negative. As long as the concurrent news is also made public at the 
same time, these firms are eliminated from our sample. As discussed in Section 2.2, 78 
announcements were eliminated due to other substantial concurrent news. Examining the 
concurrent news releases associated with these 78 announcements we find, to the contrary, that 
the concurrent news was largely positive—i.e., 53 were positive, 17 were negative, and 13 could 
not be classified. This ratio of positive to negative news is consistent with the well-known fact 
that most company announcements tend to contain positive news (e.g., see Davis, Piger, and 
Sedor, 2008), and thus does not suggest any attempts to hide negative information through the 
program announcement. 
Moreover, the fact that relatively few firms have chosen to join Climate Leaders—around 
three percent of publicly traded firms are members of CL—further suggests that the potential 
gains from such a membership are perceived to be limited or negative. If this is the case, the 
compelling question is why are firms joining programs like Climate Leaders? Reid and Toffel 
(2009) suggest that institutional pressures may induce companies to join environmental programs 
even though it implies a reduction in firm value. We test this hypothesis by conducting a probit 
analysis to identify the key factors driving the choice to join the Climate Leaders program. 
5.1 The decision to join Climate Leaders 
Table 7 reports probit estimations of a firm’s decision to join Climate Leaders. The regressions 
are significant with a pseudo (Nagelkerke) R2 ranging from 16% to 27%. We restrict the analysis 
to rival firms within the same 4-digit industry and year as the sample firms. The sample is 78 
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firms in the CL program as well as 1,237 unique industry-year rivals with available Compustat 
data.26
A number of interesting results emerge from these regressions. First, in support of the 
findings of Reid and Toffel (2009), we find that firms with a higher number of shareholder 
proposals targeted at issues related to climate change have a significantly higher probability of 
joining Climate Leaders. Combined with the earlier evidence of negative announcement returns, 
this is consistent with the notion that shareholder activists may push for such voluntary 
environmental commitments even if it reduces firm value. Controlling for climate-related 
shareholder resolutions, we find that firms with poorer corporate governance standards are more 
likely to join, as evident from the positive and significant coefficients associated with the GIM 
index and the KLD measure for corporate governance concerns (column 6). The remaining 
governance variables are insignificant.  
 The first two columns exclude the KLD measures, the GIM index, and the board stock 
ownership fraction, and are run with and without the time dummy 2006-08. The third and fourth 
columns replicate columns one and two, respectively, but include the GIM index, for a reduced 
sample of 65 CL firms and 465 rivals. Lastly, columns five and six replicate the regressions in 
columns three and four, but include the KLD environmental and corporate governance measures 
and the fraction board stock ownership, for an even smaller sample of 61 CL firms and 356 
industry rivals. In addition to the variables used in Table 5, we include a dummy indicating 
whether or not the firm is listed on NASDAQ (versus NYSE or Amex). 
It is also the case that firms listed on NASDAQ are less likely to join, consistent with the 
summary statistics in Table 2 above, which shows that the sample firms are typically larger than 
their industry rivals. It is possible that the larger firms have more widely-spread share ownership 
                                                 
26 The sample includes seven firms announcing a greenhouse gas goal that were excluded from the CL sample above 
because their announcement to join the Climate Leaders program is corrupted by concurrent news, or we are unable 
to exactly determine this date. 
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and therefore an inherently greater conflict of interest between management and the owners of 
the firm. Interestingly, for companies listed on a given stock exchange, the firms with a relatively 
high market value of equity (e.g., larger firms) are less likely to join. 
Moreover, companies that score relatively high on environmental strengths are more 
likely to join. That is, firms choosing to join CL have already committed substantial resources to 
their environmental performance prior to these programs, consistent with the notion that 
management takes a special interest in environmental investments. When the 2006-08 time 
dummy is left out, we find that firms are more likely to join Climate Leaders when climate press 
hits are high. When the time dummy is included, firms are generally less likely to join Climate 
Leaders when press hits are high, and the time dummy itself is positive and significant. 
Therefore, it seems that a firm’s motivation to join a program like Climate Leaders has more to 
do with factors correlated with the passage of time than climate press hits, specifically. The time 
dummy also has an effect on the significance of the crude oil price variable—namely, crude oil 
price is negative and significant in the regressions without the time dummy and insignificant 
when the time dummy is added. In other words, when the time dummy is not included, 
companies seem to ignore the potential for cost savings from a reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions in their decision to join Climate Leaders. Again, this supports the view that 
considerations other than shareholder wealth, like social responsibility, motivates management to 
voluntarily make a commitment to CL. 
In sum, even though joining a program like Climate Leaders may not make sense from a 
shareholder value maximization point of view—as evident from our event study results in Table 
4—there could be other reasons why firms may be joining, as suggested by our probit results. 
First, firms may be joining the program in response to institutional pressures—reflected, for 
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instance, in the number of climate-related proposals by shareholder activists. Second, for a given 
level of shareholder resolutions associated with climate change, the firm’s management might 
decide to join for reasons other than to add value and is able to make such a decision due to the 
lack of oversight from its shareholders. This second explanation is consistent with our additional 
findings that firms which rank relatively high on their environmental strengths are more likely to 
join: management may have a desire to further improve the environmental performance of the 
firm regardless of the effect on firm value. 
6. Conclusions 
Climate change may prove to be one of the gravest environmental challenges of this century. 
U.S. emissions and climate policy are of central importance to this issue, as the U.S. accounts for 
one quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions. However, efforts to limit U.S. emissions through 
international treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol, or through federal regulations have routinely 
been defeated. The current U.S. federal climate policy relies entirely on voluntary reductions of 
corporate emissions, assisted by programs such as the EPA’s Climate Leaders program. The 
success of these voluntary programs depends on their ability to achieve meaningful company 
participation. Since broad corporate participation will ultimately depend on the wealth 
implications for shareholders, it is crucial to examine the market response to such initiatives, 
conveying information about whether it pays for companies to participate in these programs.  
Our study is one of the first to address this question with respect to climate initiatives. 
Previous studies on the relationship between environmental and financial performance have 
produced mix results. However, in general it appears that in cases where environment 
performance is tied to liability, compliance, and regulatory risks, environmental performance and 
financial performance tend to have a positive relationship. Thus, in these cases, investors are 
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interpreting the environmental investments made by the firm to be adding firm value whereas in 
other cases such investments are interpreted as value reducing. How do investors view 
environmental investments related to climate change? Our study hopes to shed light on this 
question. 
Contrary to some of these earlier studies, our event study results show significant losses 
in the market value of firms announcing that they join Climate Leaders and at their subsequent 
announcement of a greenhouse gas emissions reductions goal. In contrast, firms announcing an 
endorsement of the Ceres Principles experience insignificant stock returns, possibly because the 
Ceres program involves less specific commitments to environmental investments. For companies 
joining Climate Leaders or announcing a greenhouse gas reduction goal, we find that the stock 
price decline is larger for firms with weak corporate governance structures, suggesting that 
managers have greater discretion to make investment decisions that may not be in the interest of 
shareholders. We also find that the stock price declines in the market-to-book ratio, perhaps 
indicating that climate-related investments send a negative signal about the investment 
opportunity set for high-growth firms. The program announcements further have no statistically 
significant average valuation effects on portfolios of industry rival firms, suggesting that the 
expectation of future regulation is unaffected by additional companies signing up for Climate 
Leaders and Ceres. 
Given the significantly negative impact on stock price from Climate Leaders 
membership, what are some possible explanations for why firms would join? Our probit analysis 
shows that firms with a higher number of shareholder resolutions directed at climate change are 
more likely to join the Climate Leaders program. Controlling for these resolutions, we also find 
that firms with weak corporate governance structures are more likely to join. Thus, it seems that 
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firms are entering the Climate Leaders program despite the prospect of lowering shareholder 
value either because they are facing institutional pressures to do so, or because managers face 
less shareholder oversight, allowing them more discretion to make these types of voluntary 
environmentally responsible investment decisions.  
Our finding of a negative market response to Climate Leaders membership has important 
implications for the success of voluntary environmental programs and potentially for the need to 
regulate GHG emissions. Importantly, the results indicate that voluntary environmentally 
responsible investments of this kind conflict with firm value maximization. Indeed, firms joining 
Climate Leaders are characterized by relatively poor corporate governance standards and a high 
number of shareholder resolutions targeted at climate change. Our evidence suggests that the 
social costs of climate change may not be internalized by corporations. In light of such market 
failure, federal regulation or taxation may prove to be the only viable way to achieve a broad 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. 
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Appendix A: The event study method and test statistics 
A.1 Abnormal returns and the benchmark model 
The event study methodology is widely used in the area of financial economics. Its foun-
dation is the efficient markets hypothesis, which assumes that the prices of financial securities 
immediately reflect news reaching the market (Fama 1970). Under this hypothesis, the magni-
tude of the abnormal stock performance at the time of a corporate event provides a measure of 
the (unanticipated) impact of this event on the wealth of the firm’s shareholders. For a detailed 
review of the event study method and its statistical properties, see e.g. MacKinlay (1997) and 
Kothari and Warner (2008). 
The abnormal stock performance is measured relative to that predicted by a benchmark 
model. The traditional benchmark is the market model, which establishes a linear relationship 
between the return of an individual stock and that of the stock market portfolio (Sharpe 1964). 
Let 𝑅𝑚𝑡 be the return of the market portfolio and 𝑅𝑗𝑡 be the return of the common stock of firm j 
on trading day 𝑡 relative to the event (for which 𝑡 = 0), then the market model is 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡 . 
Here, 𝑒𝑗𝑡 is an independent and identically distributed error term associated with firm j on day t, 
with 𝐸�𝑒𝑗𝑡� = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑗𝑡) = 𝑠𝑗𝑡2 . By construction, 𝑠𝑗𝑡 is assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
and uncorrelated with 𝑅𝑘𝑡 for 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗. Further, 𝛼𝑗 and 𝛽𝑗 are the parameters of the market model 
for firm j. In this study, we construct the market portfolio from all U.S. publicly traded firms in 
the Center for Research in Securities Data (CRSP) included with equal weights. We use an ordi-
nary least square (OLS) regression to estimate the market model over the year preceding the an-
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nouncement, with an estimation period from 𝑡 = −253 through 𝑡 = −3. We require the firm’s 
stock to be traded on at least 100 days in the estimation period.27
 The abnormal return 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡 (the prediction error) for firm j on day 𝑡 in the event-window 
is the difference between the actual return and that predicted by the market model, i.e. 
 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (𝛼�𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡). 
 
The event window includes two or more days; where 𝑡 = 𝑇1 and 𝑡 = 𝑇2 is the first and last day 
in the event window, respectively, and 𝑇1 < 𝑇2. The abnormal returns can be accumulated over 
the days in the event window, such that the cumulative abnormal return for firm 𝑗 is 
𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2 = �  𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
. 
Finally, the average cumulative abnormal return across the 𝑁 sample firms is  
𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑇1,𝑇2 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2
𝑁
𝑗=1 . 
We estimate and report the average cumulative abnormal return for three different event win-
dows: t ∈ [0,1], [−1,1] and [−2,2]. Expanding the event window with one or two days provides 
some flexibility as to when the information reaches the market, but is still short enough to ex-
clude confounding news.28
 Recent studies of environmental events by, e.g., Gupta and Goldar (2005), Dasgupta, 
Ho, Laplante, and Mamingi (2006) and Canon-de-Francia and Garces-Ayerbe (2009) use the 
market model as the benchmark. In robustness tests (not presented in the paper), we estimate the 
abnormal returns relative to a four-factor model including the two factors (SMB and HML) pro-
posed by Fama and French (1993) and the momentum factor introduced by Carhart (1997). For 
  
                                                 
27 This restriction is not binding for any of the sample firms. 
28 See, e.g., McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for a discussion of the length of the event window. 
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the short event windows used in this paper, the inferences from the four factor model are largely 
the same as those from the single-factor market model. 
A.2 Test statistics and their properties 
 It is not uncommon that the cross-sectional dispersion of stock returns increases around 
an event. The parametric test proposed by Patell (1976) deals with such event-induced variance 
by standardizing each abnormal return 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡 with its estimated standard deviation ?̂?𝑗𝑡 to get an 
estimated standardized abnormal return (or standardized prediction error) 
𝑆𝐴𝑅� 𝑗𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡
?̂?𝑗𝑡
. 
The maximum likelihood estimate of the standard deviation ?̂?𝑗𝑡 is 
?̂?𝑗𝑡 = �
∑ 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡2−3𝑡=−253
𝑀𝑗 − 2
�1 +
1
𝑀𝑗
+
(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅�𝑚)2
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅�𝑚)2−3𝑡=−253
� , 
where  𝑀𝑗 is the number of non-missing trading day returns for stock 𝑗 in the estimation period, 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the observed return on the market index on day t, and 𝑅�𝑚 is the average market return 
over the estimation period of firm 𝑗. 
 Under the null hypothesis, each 𝑆𝐴𝑅� 𝑗𝑡 follows a Student’s t distribution with 𝑀𝑗 − 2 de-
grees of freedom. The test statistic for the null hypothesis that 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅� 𝑇1,𝑇2 = 0 is 
𝑍𝑇1,𝑇2 =
1
√𝑁
�
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅� 𝑗𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
�(𝑇2 − 𝑇1 + 1)
𝑀𝑗 − 2
𝑀𝑗 − 4
𝑁
𝑗=1
 , 
which is distributed unit normal under 𝐻0 for large 𝑁. 
 We compute the standard Patell test as well as a bootstrapped Patell test. The latter per-
forms non-parametric bootstrapping to determine the significance level, adjusting the Patell test 
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for serial dependence in both parametric and bootstrap results. The bootstrap tests are performed 
for the various event windows. For a detailed discussion of the bootstrap method in event stu-
dies, see Kramer (2001) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). In our event study, the Patell test 
statistics are merely marginally affected by the bootstrapping. Thus, for expositional purposes, 
we report only the bootstrapped Patell test. 
 Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) introduce an extension of the Patell test called 
the standardized cross-sectional test. This test compensates for a possible increase in the disper-
sion of stock returns on the event date by incorporating a cross-sectional variance adjustment. 
The test is the same as the Patell test described above except that there is a final empirical cross-
sectional variance adjustment in place of the analytical variance of the total standardized predic-
tion error. The estimation-period standard deviation (adjusted for forecast error) is 
𝑈�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2 = �
∑ 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡2−3𝑡=−253
𝑀𝑗 − 2
𝐿𝑗 �1 +
𝐿𝑗
𝑀𝑗
+
∑ �𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝐿𝑗𝑅�𝑚�
2𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝑘 − 𝑅�𝑚)2
𝑀𝑗
𝑘=1
� , 
where 𝐿𝑗 = 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 + 1 is the number of days in the event period. Define the standardized cu-
mulative abnormal return for stock 𝑗 as 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2
𝑈�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2
 
The standardized cross-sectional test statistic for the null hypotheses that 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅� 𝑇1,𝑇2 = 0 is then 
𝑍𝑇1,𝑇2 =
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2
𝑁
𝑗=1
� 𝑁
𝑁 − 1∑ �𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅
� 𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 −
1
𝑁∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅
�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2
𝑁
𝑗=1 �
2
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 , 
again distributed unit normal for large 𝑁. 
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 The tables finally report the p-value from a generalized sign test developed by Cowan 
(1992). This test controls for the normal asymmetry of positive and negative cumulative abnor-
mal returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,𝑇1,𝑇2) in the event period 𝑇1 through 𝑇2. 
  
43 
 
 
Figure 1: Intensity of U.S. press articles on climate change, 1993-2008 
The graph shows the monthly number of U.S. press hits in Factiva for the words “climate leader”, “climate change”, 
or “global warming”, 1993-2008. 
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Figure 2: U.S. domestic crude oil price, 1993-2008 
The graph shows the 3-month moving average of the crude oil price in $ per barrel, 1993-2008. The price is the 
domestic first price from the U.S. Department of Energy/Energy Information Administration's Monthly Energy 
Review. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_dfp1_k_m.htm. 
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Table 1: Distribution of cases over time and event 
The table shows the distribution of the sample firms over time and event. The CL column reports the number of 
firms joining the EPA Climate Leaders program in each year, the GHG column reports the number of firms in the 
Climate Leaders program announcing their goal for greenhouse gas reductions in each year, and the Ceres column 
reorts the number of firms endorsing the Ceres Principles in each year. Fall of 2008 is defined as announcements 
taking place in the period September 1 through December 31, 2008. 
 
Announcement year All sample firms CL GHG  Ceres 
1993 2 0 0 2 
1994 1 0 0 1 
1997 3 0 0 3 
1998 1 0 0 1 
1999 1 0 0 1 
2000 1 0 0 1 
2001 1 0 0 1 
2002 14 13 1 0 
2003 12 7 5 0 
2004 9 4 5 0 
2005 5 0 4 1 
2006 22 13 3 6 
2007 21 16 2 3 
2008 24 21 3 0 
 of which in the fall of 2008 13 10 3 0 
Total 117 74 23 20 
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Table 2: Financial and industry characteristics of the sample firms 
The table shows various financial and industry characteristics of the sample firms. The CL column reports summary 
statistics for the 74 firms that joined the EPA Climate Leaders program, the GHG column reports summary statistics 
for the 23 Climate Leaders firms that announced a greenhouse gas reduction goal, and the Ceres column reports 
summary statistics for the 20 firms that endorsed the Ceres Principles, 1993-2008. Market value of equity is meas-
ured six trading days prior to the announcement and is obtained from CRSP. Industry rivals are all firms in CRSP 
with the same 4-digit SIC code as the sample firm in the announcement year. Total sales is measured in the year 
prior to the announcement and obtained from Compustat. The Herfindahl index is defined as ∑ �𝑠𝑗/∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 �
2𝑛
𝑗=1 , 
where 𝑠𝑗 is total sales for firm 𝑗 and 𝑗 = [1,𝑛] is an index of all firms in the industry. ***, **, and * indicate that the 
sample firms are significantly different from their respective industry median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively, using a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
 
 All sample 
firms 
CL GHG  Ceres 
Number of firms 
Market value of equity (MVE, $ billions)  
117 74 23 20 
 Mean MVE 77.8 93.0 86.1 12.7 
 Median MVE 19.2 27.5 19.0 2.9 
Fraction of firms with MVE > industry median MVE 0.91** 0.96*** 0.95* 0.65 
     
Total sales ($ billions)     
 Mean sales 18.9 20.6 22.2 8.6 
 Median sales 9.9 9.9 14.5 8.1 
Fraction of sample firms with sales > industry median sales 0.94*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 0.72* 
     
Market-to-book (MB) ratio      
 Mean MB 3.68 3.73 4.11 3.01 
 Median MB 2.57 2.76 2.81 2.17 
Proportion sample firms with MB > industry median MB 0.63** 0.63** 0.77* 0.47 
     
Fraction of sample firms listed on NASDAQ (v. NYSE/Amex) 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.17 
     
Number of rival firms in each industry portfolio     
 Mean # of rivals 35 31 43 38 
 Median # of rivals 16 12 31 22 
     
Herfindahl industry (HI) concentration index     
 Mean HI 0.34 0.37 0.25 0.33 
 Median HI 0.26 0.32 0.11 0.24 
     
Fraction of sample firms in the industry of     
 Manufacturing 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.45 
 Finance 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.15 
 Transportation 0.16 0.12 0.22 0.25 
 Other 0.18 0.21 0.08 0.15 
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Table 3: Environmental performance and corporate governance characteristics of the sample firms 
The table shows environmental performance and corporate governance characteristics of the sample firms.  The CL 
column reports summary statistics for the 74 firms that joined the EPA Climate Leaders program, the GHG column 
reports summary statistics for the 23 Climate Leaders firms that announced a greenhouse gas reduction goal, and the 
Ceres column reports summary statistics for the 20 firms that endorsed the Ceres Principles, 1993-2008. The criteria 
for carbon intensity and the emissions of greenhouse gases are taken from the Carbon Disclosure Project and the 
values are obtained from the firm’s sustainability report. The environmental rankings are obtained from KLD Stats 
in the year prior to the announcement. The GIM index and shareholder proposals are obtained from RiskMetrics. ***, 
**, and * indicate that the sample firms ratings are significantly different from their respective industry mean at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using a two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
 
 All sample 
firms 
CL GHG  Ceres 
     
Number of firms 117 74 23 20 
 
Carbon intensity     
Fraction of firms in carbon intensive industries 0.53 0.53 0.61 0.45 
     
State of incorporation     
Fraction of firms in RGGI states 0.60 0.62 0.57 0.55 
Fraction of firms in WCI states 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.10 
     
Goal for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions     
Number of firms with greenhouse gas reduction goals 42 19 23 n/a 
 Mean reduction goal 16% 17% 16% n/a 
 Median reduction goal 15% 15% 15% n/a 
 Mean # of years to achieve goal 6.8 6.7 6.8 n/a 
 Median # of years to achieve goal 6.0 6.0 6.0 n/a 
     
Number of sample firms with KLD data 99 64 21 14 
     
Environmental strengths      
 Mean # of strengths 0.47*** 0.39** 0.67*** 0.57** 
 Proportion firms with score ≥ industry mean 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.87 
     
Environmental concerns      
 Mean # of concerns 0.79*** 0.81** 0.95 0.43 
 Proportion firms with score ≥ industry mean 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.87 
     
GIM corporate governance index (max 18)      
Number of firms with GIM index score 96 60 21 15 
 Mean GIM index 9.5 9.7 9.1 9.0 
 Median GIM index 9.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 
     
# of shareholder proposals related to climate change      
Number of firms with at least one shareholder proposal 10 7 3 0 
 Mean # of proposals 0.12 0.14 0.17 0 
 Median # of proposals 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4: Announcement cumulative abnormal return (𝑪𝑨𝑹�) estimates for the sample firms 
 
The CL columns report results for firms that joined the EPA Climate Leaders program, the GHG columns report results for the Climate Leaders firms that announced a greenhouse 
gas reduction goal, and the Ceres columns report results for the firms that endorsed the Ceres Principles, 1993-2008. The abnormal return for firm j is estimated as 𝐴𝑅�𝑗𝑡 =
𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (𝛼�𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡), where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the return of the stock of firm j on day t; 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the equal-weighted market return on day t; and 𝛼�𝑗 and ?̂?𝑗 are the coefficients estimated from the 
single-factor market model 𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 over 250 days, ending on day -3. The standardized cross-sectional test is an extension of the Patell (1996) test introduced by 
Boehmer, Musimeci and Poulsen (1991). The ratio of positive to negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�s is tested with a generalized sign test (Cowan, 1992). ***, ** and * denotes significance for a 2-tailed 
test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Column number  1 2  3 4 5  6  7 
  All sample firms  CL  GHG  Ceres 
  1993-2008 1993-2008  2002-2008 2002-2005 2006-2008  2002-2008  1993-2008 
Includes announcements in fall 2008  yes no  no  no  no  no 
Panel A. Event window [0,1]             
Average 𝐶𝐴𝑅�0,1 (in %)  -0.03 -0.54  -0.59 -0.47 -0.67  -1.01  0.11 
Standardized cross-sectional test Z  -1.050 -3.101***  -1.994** -0.743 -1.965**  -3.439***  -0.354 
Bootstrap Patell Z  -1.282 -2.622***  -1.790* -0.679 -1.751*  -2.504**  -0.262 
Ratio of positive to negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�0,1  51:66 39:62**  24:37 12:12 12:25**  6:14*  9:11 
Number of observations  117 101  61 24 37  20  20 
Panel B. Event window [-1,1]                           
Average 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−1,1 (in %)  -0.20 -0.73  -1.00 -0.73 -1.17  -1.13  0.45 
Standardized cross-sectional test Z  -1.471 -3.603***  -3.398*** -1.369 -3.300***  -2.750***  0.493 
Bootstrap Patell Z  -1.608 -2.757***  -2.547** -1.103 -2.731***  -2.171**  0.344 
Ratio of positive to negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−1,1  44:65* 35:58**  19:39** 8:14 11:25**  4:12*  12:7 
Number of observations  109 93  58 22 36  16  19 
Panel C. Event window [-2,2]                           
Average 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−2,2 (in %)  -0.44 -1.08  -1.50 -1.83 -1.28  -1.16  0.33 
Standardized cross-sectional test Z  -1.590 -3.034***  -2.997*** -1.700* -2.438**  -1.547  0.419 
Bootstrap Patell Z  -2.087** -3.079***  -3.145*** -1.743* -2.639***  -1.708*  0.299 
Ratio of positive to negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−2,2  34:56** 25:52***  15:32** 6:13 9:19*  3:12**  7:8 
Number of observations  90 77  47 19 28  15  15 
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Table 5: Cross-sectional determinants of the announcement 𝑪𝑨𝑹�s  
Coefficient estimates from WLS regressions of the announcement cumulative abnormal returns over the [-1,1] win-
dow, 𝐶𝐴𝑅�𝑗,−1,1. The weight is the standard deviation of the residual in the market model estimation. The sample 
comprises of 70 firms that joined the EPA Climate Leaders program (CL) or pledged a greenhouse gas goal (GHG), 
1/2002-8/2008.a p-values are in parenthesis. 
Intercept -0.030 -0.054 -0.020 -0.037 -0.013 -0.041 
 (0.160) (0.068) (0.349) (0.277) (0.629) (0.381) 
Ln (Climate press hits) 0.005 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.009 
  (0.065) (0.041) (0.014) (0.059) (0.085) (0.140) 
Crude oil price residual 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.069) (0.063) (0.194) (0.187) (0.322) (0.295) 
Carbon intensive industry -0.008 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.007 
 (0.127) (0.076) (0.978) (0.978) (0.485) (0.401) 
Market value of equity ($ bill.) -0.047 -0.047 -0.071 -0.072 -0.036 -0.038 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.205) (0.185) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.050) (0.035) (0.063) (0.068) (0.023) (0.023) 
Herfindahl index -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.459) (0.450) (0.736) (0.747) (0.826) (0.893) 
RGGI state -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.198) (0.281) (0.028) (0.040) (0.356) (0.415) 
Shareholder climate proposals     0.000 0.000 
     (0.965) (0.928) 
KLD environmental strengths     -0.002 0.000 
     (0.722) (0.841) 
KLD environmental concerns     0.000 -0.001 
     (0.709) (0.678) 
GIM index   -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.032) (0.030) 
KLD corp. governance strengths     0.001 0.004 
     (0.980) (0.884) 
KLD corp. governance concerns     -0.004 -0.003 
     (0.437) (0.654) 
Board stock ownership fraction     0.001 0.001 
     (0.124) (0.109) 
Time dummy 2006-2008  -0.010  -0.006  -0.009 
  (0.237)  (0.522)  (0.462) 
Number of cases, N 70 70 61 61 57 57 
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.152 0.290 0.282 0.178 0.169 
F-value 2.72 2.57 4.12 3.66 1.88 1.77 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.057) (0.073) 
a The number of cases N is less than 74 due to missing explanatory variables in 4 cases.
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Table 6: Announcement cumulative abnormal return (𝑪𝑨𝑹�) estimates for rival firm portfolios 
 
The CL columns report results for the rivals of firms that joined the EPA Climate Leaders program, the GHG columns report results for the rivals of Climate Leaders firms that 
announced a greenhouse gas reduction goal, and the Ceres columns report results for the rivals of firms that endorsed the Ceres Principles, 1993-2008. The abnormal return for 
portfolio r is estimated as 𝐴𝑅�𝑟𝑡 = 𝑅𝑟𝑡 − (𝛼�𝑟 + ?̂?𝑟𝑅𝑚𝑡), where 𝑅𝑟𝑡 is the return of an equal-weighted portfolio r of the sample firm’s industry rivals on day t; 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the equal-
weighted market return on day t; and 𝛼�𝑟  and ?̂?𝑟 are the coefficients estimated from the market model 𝑅𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑟 + 𝛽𝑟𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑟𝑡 over 250 days, ending on day -3. The standardized 
cross-sectional test is an extension of the Patell (1996) test introduced by Boehmer, Musimeci and Poulsen (1991). The ratio of positive to negative CARs is tested with a genera-
lized sign test (Cowan, 1992). ***, ** and * denotes significance for a 2-tailed test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Column number  1 2  3 4 5  6  7 
  All sample firms  CL  GHG  Ceres 
  1993-2008 1993-2008  2002-2008 2002-2005 2006-2008  2002-2008  1993-2008 
Includes announcements in fall 2008  yes no  no  no  no  no 
Panel A. Event window [0,1]             
Average 𝐶𝐴𝑅�0,1 (in %)  0.16 0.00  0.08 -0.02 0.15  -0.23  0.00 
Standardized cross-sectional test Z  0.849 -0.277  0.616 0.403 0.459  -0.766  -0.443 
Bootstrap Patell Z  1.059 -0.287  0.559 0.355 0.432  -0.972  -0.461 
Ratio of positive to negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�0,1  55:53 46:48  28:28 11:13 17:15  8:11  10:9 
Number of rival firm portfolios  108 94  56 24 32  19  19 
Panel B. Event window [-1,1]                           
Average 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−1,1 (in %)  0.22 -0.08  0.05 0.19 -0.05  -0.52  -0.08 
Standardized cross-sectional test Z  0.166 -0.995  -0.301 0.603 -0.627  -1.589  -0.514 
Bootstrap Patell Z  0.222 -1.157  -0.390 0.530 -0.957  -1.540  -0.454 
Ratio of positive to negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−1,1  44:56 35:51*  23:30 10:12 13:18  2:13***  10:8 
Number of rival firm portfolios  100 86  53 22 31  15  18 
Panel C. Event window [-2,2]                           
Average 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−2,2 (in %)  0.21 -0.07  0.10 1.46 -0.98  -0.95  0.31 
Standardized cross-sectional test Z  0.107 -0.758  -0.330 1.801* -1.661*  -1.840*  0.927 
Bootstrap Patell Z  0.167 -0.840  -0.223 1.836* -2.191**  -1.736*  0.573 
Ratio of positive to negative 𝐶𝐴𝑅�−2,2  38:44 31:40  21:22 13:6 8:16  3:11**  7:7 
Number of rival firm portfolios  82 71  43 19 24  14  14 
 
 
51 
Table 7: Determinants of the decision to join Climate Leaders 
Coefficient estimates from probit regressions for the probability that a firm joins Climate Leaders (CL) in 2002-
2008. The sample is 78 firms in CL and 1,237 of unique industry-year rivals. p-values are in parenthesis.  
Intercept -4.459 18.04 -6.704 14.35 -6.102 13.99 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.005) 
Ln (Climate press hits) 0.293 -3.139 0.539 -2.701 0.445 -2.633 
  (0.065) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) 
Crude oil price residual -0.014 0.016 -0.021 0.003 -0.024 -0.003 
 (0.093) (0.131) (0.036) (0.808) (0.028) (0.778) 
Carbon intensive industry -0.319 -0.333 -0.531 -0.555 -0.530 -0.541 
 (0.212) (0.227) (0.083) (0.096) (0.148) (0.163) 
Market value of equity ($ bill.) -0.740 -1.078 -1.118 -1.523 -1.619 -2.008 
 (0.055) (0.016) (0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.003) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.043 0.015 0.025 
 (0.939) (0.954) (0.211) (0.086) (0.560) (0.369) 
NASDAQ -2.395 -2.358 -1.452 -1.309 -1.177 -1.804 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.015) (0.028) 
RGGI state 0.637 0.610 0.324 0.302 0.147 0.040 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.295) (0.353) (0.672) (0.913) 
Shareholder climate proposals 0.861 1.389 0.884 1.031 0.806 1.000 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.031) (0.007) 
KLD environmental strengths     0.593 0.471 
     (0.016) (0.069) 
KLD environmental concerns     -0.128 -0.155 
     (0.406) (0.339) 
GIM index   0.101 0.113 0.116 0.121 
   (0.082) (0.065) (0.075) (0.071) 
KLD corp. governance strengths     -0.759 -0.944 
     (0.486) (0.417) 
KLD corp. governance concerns     0.389 0.540 
     (0.168) (0.084) 
Board stock ownership fraction     0.008 0.005 
     (0.678) (0.825) 
Time dummy 2006-2008  7.627  7.360  7.038 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Number of sample firms 78 78 65 65 61 61 
Number of rival firms 1,237 1,237 465 465 356 356 
Nagelkerke R2 0.162 0.249 0.139 0.244 0.176 0.267 
χ2 79.57 124.6 40.25 72.64 43.75 68.22 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
